North Carolina Air Toxics Regulations by Schmitt, Deanna
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 69 | Number 6 Article 3
9-1-1991
North Carolina Air Toxics Regulations
Deanna Schmitt
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deanna Schmitt, North Carolina Air Toxics Regulations, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1579 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol69/iss6/3
NOTES
North Carolina Air Toxics Regulations
The State of North Carolina recently adopted regulations for the control of
toxic air pollutants (TAPs) within its borders.' The regulations are the latest
step in an air toxics program the State began developing in 1985 in response to
reports of increasing in-state emissions of toxic pollutants.2 Although the fed-
eral government purported to control air toxics through section 112 of the Clean
Air Act (CAA),3 federal regulation had proven to be virtually unworkable. Not
only did the federal statutory scheme place unrealistic deadlines upon the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA),4 but it also required the Agency to regu-
late hazardous pollutants with an "ample margin of safety," 5 a particularly
arduous task considering no conclusive scientific data exists for determining
"safe" exposure levels for many pollutants. 6 As a practical matter, individual
states had to regulate air toxics on their own.7
In February 1990, the North Carolina Environmental Management Com-
mission (EMC) adopted a program regulating 105 toxic air pollutants., Because
the air toxic guidelines went into effect as of May 1990, 9 there has been little
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the North Carolina measures or their
impact on industry. Meanwhile, in November 1990, the federal government
revitalized its regulatory scheme to address more effectively the hazardous air
pollution problem. 10 Title III of the 1990 CAA lists 189 TAPs that the EPA
must regulate by source categories over the next ten years.' 1 The Act delegates
1. NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC AIR EMISSIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN UPDATE FOR 1989 2 (2d ed. Oct. 1990) [hereinafter NCEDF]. The North Carolina
Environmental Defense Fund analyzes air toxic emissions in North Carolina and prepares yearly
data reports. Id. at 1.
2. Id. at 6. In 1988, North Carolina ranked twelfth nationally in total air toxics emissions by
weight and exceeded the emissions of California and New Jersey. Id. at 22.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988), amended by Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301,
104 Stat. 2399, 2531 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
7. See I DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,
HEALTH, AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF PUBLIC HEARINGS ON PRO-
POSED AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS 15A NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 2D.0535
AND .0902 AND 2H.0602, at I-I (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter HEARINGS]. As of 1986 approximately 38
states had regulated or were in the process of regulating toxic air pollutants. 4 id. app. B at VI-60
(survey of state air toxics programs).
8. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990). The air toxics regulations controlled
emissions for 84 of the toxic substances as of May 1, 1990, and emissions for the remaining 21
beginning May 1, 1991. Id. Vigorous opposition by various industries as well as the requirement of
a lengthy economic impact assessment delayed the promulgation for several years. NCEDF, supra
note 1, at 2; see 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
9. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990).
10. See Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531-74 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
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the task of developing standards of "maximum achievable control technology"
(MAC'T) for various source categories to the EPA, with such standards to be
developed on an industry-wide basis. 12 In light of the federal government's new
air toxics regulations, the question arises whether the EMC will administer the
North Carolina regulations in their present form or as a supplement to the fed-
eral standards, or whether the Commission will have to revise or abandon the
North Carolina regulations to meet the new federal requirements.
This Note begins by surveying the development of the North Carolina air
toxics regulations and summarizing the substantive provisions of both Title III
of the 1990 CAA amendments and the North Carolina regulations, distinguish-
ing the regulatory approaches of each.13 The Note then suggests that North
Carolina retain its present regulations to remedy the existing problem of toxic
air pollution, demonstrating that these regulations can coexist with the new fed-
eral system of air toxics regulations. The Note further contends that North Car-
olina should not rely on its regulatory scheme as merely a protective measure in
the event of the EPA's default or failure of the federal air toxics program, but
should begin immediate and complete implementation of its own toxic air regu-
lations to ensure that its goals for cleaner air are attained. Unlike the federal
regulations, North Carolina's air toxics guidelines may be better suited to ad-
dress specific problem areas by regulating on a facility-by-facility basis and pro-
viding for additional attention where multiple sources are located. The Note
concludes that, although the uniform regulatory approach used by the CAA
may provide the best "fit" for a national solution to the air toxics problem, the
federal program may overlook localized problem areas. North Carolina must
retain its more flexible regulations, implementing them in conjunction with the
CAA to ensure more comprehensive control of toxic air pollution.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA AIR Toxics REGULATIONS
Congress designed former section 112 of the federal CAA to eliminate the
TAP problem; unfortunately, the statute fell far short of this goal. 14 Section 112
required that the EPA "list" certain toxic substances for which it intended to
promulgate standards.15 Although there were dozens of potential candidates for
regulation, the EPA listed only eight pollutants in the twenty years after section
112 was enacted.16
12. Id. § 7412(d),(e); see J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, THE NEW CLEAN AIR AcT: A GUIDE TO
THE CLEAN AIR PROGRAM AS AMENDED IN 1990, at 31 (1990).
13. The North Carolina regulations follow a predominately health-based approach, while the
federal regulations, in contrast, follow a technology-based approach. For an explanation of each
regulatory method, see infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
14. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at -1 (noting the "relatively limited ability" of § 112 of the
old CAA to control toxic air pollutants).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1988), amended by Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)); see Note,
Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Section 112 ofthe Clean Air Act, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 617 (1988).
16. Marchant & Danzeisen, "Acceptable" Risk for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 535, 536 (1989). The eight pollutants currently listed are asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke
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There are several reasons why the EPA has allowed many potentially haz-
ardous pollutants to go unregulated. Part of the problem stems from the statute
itself: the statute's time constraints made expansive listing impracticable. Sec-
tion 112 required the EPA to list substances that the EPA Administrator de-
cided "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness." 17 Within
180 days after listing a pollutant, the Administrator had to publish proposed
regulations and give notice of public hearings for comment to be held within
thirty days.18 Within 180 days of the proposal publication, the EPA had to
promulgate final emission standards 19 setting "the level which in [the Adminis-
trator's] judgment provide[d] an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health from such hazardous air pollutants."' 20 These time constraints forced the
EPA to conduct the extensive research necessary to determine appropriate emis-
sions standards for a pollutant without time for a thorough assessment. 21 More-
over, after each listing the EPA had to identify all emission sources, investigate
various kinds of control strategies, and obtain information on compliance costs
before it could publish final emissions standards. Such preparation for final
emission standards usually takes a minimum of two years.22 The EPA, knowing
it could not present final emissions standards for numerous TAPs within six
months, began slowing the process by listing only one pollutant at a time.23
Although unrealistic time constraints may have delayed the listing process
somewhat, a more serious problem stemmed from the "ample margin of
safety" 24 concept. Most toxic substances regulated under section 112 are carcin-
ogens that have no known "threshold" below which adverse human health ef-
fects do not occur.2 5 This means that no level of exposure has been identified as
inherently "safe." If no safe exposure level exists, then section 112 literally re-
quired complete and immediate prohibition of all emissions of a pollutant once
the EPA listed it.26 Such an all-or-nothing approach caused the EPA to choose
"nothing" more often than not. Complete elimination of many pollutants may
be technologically impossible. Moreover, outright bans could induce the shut-
down of major industries, resulting in massive social dislocation. 27 To avoid
such dire consequences and in response to pressure from industry, the EPA in-
oven emissions, inorganic arsenic, mercury, radionuclides, and vinyl chloride. National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. § 61.01 (1990).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).
18. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 123-24.
22. Id. at 124.
23. Id. at 124-25. Failure to list a pollutant within a reasonable time is legally defensible be-
cause § 112 places no time limit on the listing of a pollutant. Id. at 125.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
25. Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 16, at 536-37; see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 613, 638 n.43 (1980) (recognizing that no "safe exposure
level" exists for certain pollutants).
26. See Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 16, at 537.
27. Id.
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stead chose to regulate only a few pollutants. 2 To avert widespread industry
shutdown, the EPA based the few standards it set on "best available" control
technology. 29 In short, the EPA's steadfast refusal to entertain major industry
closings as a solution to the TAP problem rendered Congress's strict health-
based approach to toxic emissions limitations a dead-end path to progressive
pollution control.
Once the federal system proved inadequate, states began filling in the gaps
with their own air toxics legislation. By 1987, several states, including Califor-
nia and New Jersey, already had remedial legislation in place.30 North Caro-
lina, however, had not reacted yet to the growing toxic air emissions problem.
In 1985, North Carolina decided to take action for several reasons. First,
heightened public concern about toxic chemicals in the atmosphere necessitated
action.31 Second, the State was aware that the EPA bad failed to regulate these
pollutants effectively under section 112.32 Third, scientific reports indicated an
increase in the release of numerous TAPs-including carcinogens, mutagens,
and teratogens-into North Carolina skies.3 3
With funding from the EPA, the North Carolina Division of Environmen-
tal Management (DEM) began a survey of sources of North Carolina toxic air
pollutants. 34 After compiling a list of pollutants, DEM initially sought to emu-
late other state programs by proposing a "strict factored approach" to obtain
ambient air levels. 35 This approach uses the threshold limit value (TLV) 36 of a
pollutant multiplied by a particular safety factor.37 Industry strongly objected
to this approach, arguing that the DEM applied the TLVs out of context and
that a constant safety factor was inappropriate under the circumstances. 38
28. Id.
29. Note, supra note 15, at 615. Best available technology (BAT) standards consider both tech-
nological feasibility and economic cost of implementation. Id. The statutory language of § 112,
however, precludes tradeoffs between health factors and nonhealth feasibility factors. See 42 U.S.C.
7412(b)(1)(B); Note, supra note 15, at 613. In fact, Congress envisioned the possible shutdown of
industries in the absence of control technology available to assure zero emissions. See 116 CONG.
REc. 42,385 (1970). At least one court has upheld the EPA's decision to incorporate feasibility
factors in setting emissions standards. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1146, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
30. NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ToxIc AIR EMISSIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN UPDATE FOR 1988, at 21 (1989).
31. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-3 (listing reasons for instituting a North Carolina air
toxics program).
32. Id.
33. Id. A mutagen is a substance that tends to increase the frequency of alterations in genetic
or hereditary material. 2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1492 (1976). A
teratogen is a substance that causes developmental malformations in fetuses. Id. at 2358.
34. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-3.
35. Id. at 1-2. For an explanation of a modified (as opposed to a strict) factored threshold limit
value approach, see infra note 54.
36. A threshold limit value (TLV) is the "time-weighted average concentration, for a normal 8-
hour workday and 40-hour workweek, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed,...
without adverse effect." AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRIAL HYGIEN-
ISTS, THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES AND BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE INDICES FOR 1988-1989, at 4 (1988)
[hereinafter ACGIH]; NCEDF, supra note 1, app. C.
37. The strict factored approach applies only one safety factor (1/200) to the threshold limit
value of a pollutant to obtain acceptable ambient levels (AALs).
38. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
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Therefore, industry suggested that North Carolina establish an independent sci-
entific panel to develop acceptable ambient levels (AAL) for the pollutants.39
The North Carolina Academy of Sciences established the Air Toxics Panel,
charging it with reviewing the list of proposed toxic air pollutants recom-
mending a suitable approach for determining AALs.4°
In reviewing the list of pollutants the Panel limited its choices to chemicals
that the American Conference of Government and Industrial Hygienists already
had assigned a TLV, that the EPA had listed as carcinogens in the category of
Group A (human carcinogens) or Group B (probable human carcinogens), 4 ' or
that North Carolina Division of Health Services considered to be of public
health concern. The Panel further limited its work to chemicals for which there
was potential exposure in North Carolina.42 Additionally, the scientific panel
proposed a "modified factored approach" 43 in determining the AALs.
After these initial studies, the EMC entered into a contract with Radian
Corporation to do an economic impact study of the proposed regulations." At
public hearings on the proposed regulations, various industrial representatives
argued that the economic impact statement was incomplete and that it underes-
timated the regulations' impact by "ignoring the loss of competitiveness and the
resulting loss of profitability that would accompany a slight increase in prices for
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Group A human carcinogens are those chemicals for which there is sufficient evidence from
epidemiological studies to support a causal association between exposure to the agent and cancer.
Group B probable human carcinogens are chemicals for which there is sufficient evidence of carcino-
genicity from animal studies and limited or inadequate evidence from epidemiological studies. EPA
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 34,000 (1986). North Carolina's
AALs for carcinogens are based on unit risk factors developed by the EPA's Carcinogen Assessment
Group (CAG). Unit risk factor is an estimate of the incremental lifetime cancer risk over the back-
ground occurring in a population in which all individuals are exposed continuously to a concentra-
tion of 1 ug/m 3 of the agent in the air that they breathe. EPA Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,294, 46,299 (1984); 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-650.
42. NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
AIR Toxics PANEL OF THE NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 6 (Sept. 1986), reprinted in
4 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-7 [hereinafter AIR Toxics PANEL]. Limiting the lists of air toxics
to those that pose an actual threat to human health in North Carolina saves both time and money.
The EMC's resources should be allocated properly to control only those pollutants that North Caro-
lina's industries actually emit.
43. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2; see infra note 54.
44. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2; see RADIAN CORPORATION, ASSESSMENT OF THE ECO-
NOMIC IMPACTS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S PROPOSED AIR Toxics REGULATION (Apr. 1988) [herein-
after RADIAN]. Section 143-215.107(f) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that in the
event the federal government has not adopted regulations on a matter, the EMC may not adopt
regulations until it considers "an assessment of the economic impact of the proposed standards."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(f) (1990).
The North Carolina legislature adopted this section-called the Hardison Amendment after
Senator Harold Hardison-in 1975. The statute constrains the EMC's development of air quality
standards in two ways. First, the EMC may not adopt standards more stringent than those promul-
gated by the federal government. Second, where the federal government has not regulated, the EMC
must conduct an economic impact assessment before the standards are adopted. Id. The economic
impact study must be part of the rule-making record and include an "estimate of the economic and
social costs to commerce and industry, units of local government, and agriculture necessary to com-
ply with the proposed standards and an examination of the economic and social benefits of such
compliance." Id.
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products produced by North Carolina industries."'45 Further, they argued that
the assessment failed to evaluate certain social impacts of the regulations, in-
cluding job losses and jobs that would not be created.4 6 Environmentalists, in
contrast, asserted that the statute requires only an "estimate" of regulatory
costs, and does not specify with any detail what the assessment should contain,
how extensive it needs to be, or what type of comparisons need to be made.47
Moreover, environmentalists argued that the DEM compiled a legitimate report,
and that the study could be reasonably relied upon given the limited resources
available.48 Following the public hearings, the EMC approved the economic
impact statement4 9 and the new guidelines for TAPs became effective as of May
1, 1990.50
The North Carolina regulations contain a list of TAPs that the Air Toxics
Panel divided into noncarcinogens (acute irritants, acute toxicants, and chronic
toxicants) and carcinogens. 51 The Panel chose acceptable ambient levels for
both types of pollutants. For noncarcinogens, the Panel applied various safety
factors to TLVs to obtain a concentration that protects the human population
exposed outside of the abutting property line of any emissions source. 52 These
safety factors consider variability in human susceptibility, continuous exposure
over a 168-hour week as compared to a 40-hour week, uncertainties inherent in
studies of chronic effects, and the severity of effects.53 The Panel then applied
these factors to the TLVs to determine the concentrations acceptable as ambient
air levels.54
45. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-461 (comments by Charles Case on behalf of the Chemical
Industry Council of North Carolina). Radian Corporation's impact study reported that under worst
case conditions less than three percent of 325 North Carolina facilities surveyed would experience
significant economic hardship, and 19% would be able to comply with minimal added controls or by
raising stack height. See RADIAN, supra note 44, at xiii.
46. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-461 (comments by Charles Case on behalf of Chemical
Industry Council of North Carolina).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(f) (1990).
48. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-550 (comments at public hearing by Steven Levitas on
behalf of the North Carolina Environmental Defense Fund). Environmentalists assert that limited
resources hamper North Carolina's ability to devote the time and energy necessary to achieve a
dynamic air toxics program. NCEDF, supra note I, at 23.
49. The North Carolina Attorney General has ruled that the EMC has the ultimate responsibil-
ity and authority to determine whether an economic impact assessment is sufficiently complete.
HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-88.
50. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990).
51. Id. Acute irritants are chemicals that cause irritation at the site of contact immediately
following exposure of eight hours or less. Acute toxicants are chemicals that cause adverse effects at
sites distant from the point of exposure within eight hours. Chronic toxicants are chemicals that
cause adverse effects after multiple or prolonged exposures. 4 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-32 to
VI-33.
52. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
53. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 11-16.
54. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2. The application of various safety factors to TLV values is
called a "modified factored approach." The use of several factors is designed to account for the
multiple differences between community and occupational exposures. For example, the Air Toxics
Panel decided on a factor of 10 to account for the variability in human susceptibility. AIR TOXiCS
PANEL, supra note 42, at 12. The TLV does not always reflect this variation because workers are
usually healthy adults. In contrast, the population at large includes children, elderly persons, and
other sensitive subgroups. Id. The Panel also adjusted for continuous community exposure by
adopting a factor of four to account for the difference between a 40-hour workweek and a 168-hour
1584 [Vol. 69
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The Air Toxies Panel determined the AALs for known carcinogens and
probable carcinogens in a different manner. Carcinogens, as opposed to non-
carcinogens, are nonthreshold agents. 55 Because no data confirm a safe level of
exposure for these chemicals, the Panel had to decide on an "acceptable" level of
risk.56 The Panel first categorized each agent as either a known human carcino-
gen (Group A) or probable human carcinogen (Group B), based on studies by
the Carcinogen Assessment Group of the EPA.5 7 For known carcinogens, the
Panel determined AALs based on a lifetime risk of one incidence of cancer in
one million exposed persons.58 For probable human carcinogens, the Panel de-
termined a less stringent AAL based on a lifetime risk of one incidence of cancer
in 100,000 exposed persons.59 These "acceptable" risk factors are based on cur-
rent federal and state practice and are not considered extreme.6° For known
human carcinogens, the Panel used quantitative risk assessment 61 techniques,
based on available human data, to determine the incremental air concentration
(concentration attributable to an emission source) associated with an additional
lifetime cancer risk of one in a million persons exposed.62 For probable human
carcinogens, the Panel determined AALs similarly, except it used extrapolations
from animal studies to determine the incremental air concentration associated
week. Id. at 12-13. The Panel used a factor of two to adjust for the uncertainty inherent in studies
of chronic effects. Id. at 14. It also decided to apply a safety factor of two to those agents eliciting
irreversible or life-threatening effects at concentrations that might be reasonably expected to occur in
the ambient air. Id. at 14-15.
55. "Nonthreshold" means that there is no "safe" level of exposure. Industrial Union Dept.,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 638 n.43 (1980); see Comment, The Clean Air
Act: Economic and Technological Feasibility in Setting Standards Under Section 112, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 397, 403 n.73 (1987). A minority of scientists believe that carcinogens do have a
threshold. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride A Short Course in the Law and Policy of
Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 500, 511 n.42 (1978).
56. The "acceptable" level of risk is not the product of any actual data, but is primarily a policy
decision. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 26.
57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 16.
59. Id. Industry officials critical of the AALs established by the Air Toxics Panel noted that
lifetime risk estimates assume that the average life span is 70 years and that exposure to a particular
cancer-causing agent is continuous during life. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-522 (comments
Richard V. Hargitt on behalf of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours).
60. EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Food and Drug Admin-
istration use the same criteria for control of carcinogenic chemicals. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at
V472 (comments at public hearing by Dr. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Chairman, Air Toxics Panel, North
Carolina Academy of Sciences).
61. Quantitative risk assessment, as defined by the National Academy of Sciences, is the calcu-
lation of the probability of potentially adverse health effects from human exposure to environmental
hazards. ENvIRoLoGIc DATA, REVIEW OF THE NORTH CAROL1INA PROPOSED AIR Toxics PRO-
GRAM § 1.3 (Jan. 1989), reprinted in 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-579. The risk assessment
process usually involves four steps: hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assess-
ment, and risk characterization. EPA Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 49
Fed. Reg. 46,294, 46,295 (1984). Hazard identification is a qualitative assessment that looks at the
weight of the evidence to determine whether a chemical poses a hazard to human health. Id. Dose-
response assessment characterizes the relationship between the dose of a chemical and the incidence
of an adverse health effect in humans. This process usually involves extrapolations made from high
to low doses and from animal to human exposures. Id. Exposure assessment estimates the intensity,
frequency, and duration of human exposures to a chemical in the environment. Id. Risk characteri-
zation is the final step of combining exposure and dose-response assessments to reach a quantitative
estimate of the risk. Id.
62. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 16.
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with an additional lifetime cancer risk of one in 100,000 persons exposed.63
The AALs are not strict regulations but merely guidelines that aid the
EMC in deciding whether human health is adequately protected. 64 The regula-
tions provide that a facility may not emit any of the toxic air pollutants listed "in
such quantities that may cause or contribute beyond the premises... to any
significant ambient air concentration that may adversely affect human health."' 65
The EMC is to rely on the AAL guidelines in determining what concentrations
are "significant."'66
To date, North Carolina has established AAL guidelines for 105 TAPs-
eighty-four AALs effective May 1, 1990, and twenty-one AALs effective May 1,
1991.67 With few exceptions, all sources of air toxics must have a permit to emit
any of these air toxics. 68 The regulations require existing sources to apply for a
permit or permit modification 180 days after they receive notice from the DEM
requesting that they apply for a permit to emit TAPs.69 The DEM makes such
notification or "permit calls" on the basis of Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes, which group industries of similar type.70 This grouping benefits
both the DEM and industries. It helps reduce the workload of the permitting
staff by calling only a manageable number of industries at one time. Phasing in
the program also spreads out the demand for air pollution control equipment,
making it easier and cheaper for companies to obtain and install required
technology. 71
To acquire a permit, a new source must demonstrate through modeling 72
that the AALs or guidelines will not be exceeded because of the facility's emis-
sions.73 Alternatively, a new source may avoid compliance with AALs by prov-
ing that a greater concentration than that set forth would not adversely affect
human health.74 Although this poses a difficult burden, a new source may sup-
port a request for a higher concentration in one of two ways. First, the new
source may establish that the areas where the ambient concentrations are ex-
pected to exceed the AALs "are not inhabitable or occupied for the duration of
the averaging time of the pollutant of concern." 75 For instance, a new source
63. Id. By definition, probable human carcinogens have no conclusive data based on human
epidemiological studies, but the carcinogenicity may be based on "sufficient" animal studies. See
EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 34,000 (1986) (EPA's defini-
tion of Group B probable human carcinogens).
64. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-12 (agency response to comments).
65. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990) (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. NCEDF, supra note 1, at 22; see N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D. 1104.
68. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-3; see N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610 (Aug. 1990).
With the exception of new sources combusting only unadulterated fossil fuels or wood, all new
sources of air toxics must have a permit. Id.
69. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(a)(3).
70. Id. r. 2H.0610(a)(4).
71. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-46.
72. For a discussion of modeling, see infra text accompanying notes 86-98.
73. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(b)(1).
74. Id. r. 2H.0610(b)(2).
75. Id. r. 2H.0610(b)(2)(A).
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may assert that the area in question is over a body of water and cannot be inhab-
ited. Of course, for pollutants with a short averaging time,7 6 an owner may still
have difficulty showing that persons will not occupy the area during that time.
For example, even if the area in question is an uninhabited body of water, fishing
or other recreational activities may bring people into the area for short periods
of time. Second, a new source may produce new toxicological data showing that
the AAL for the pollutant in question is too low and the facility's ambient im-
pact is below the level indicated by the new data.77 Such data, however, is not
easy to come by and may prove quite costly to obtain.7 8 Furthermore, because
of the uncertainties inherently involved in air toxics research, it is doubtful that
a source will be able to prove with any degree of accuracy that a higher concen-
tration will not adversely affect human health in any way.
Likewise, existing sources may obtain a permit by demonstrating either that
they will comply with the guidelines, that noncompliance would not adversely
affect human health, or that they qualify for one of three exceptions.7 9 An ex-
isting source may receive a permit, even if it is not in compliance, if it submits a
schedule satisfying the agency that it will comply with the air toxics guidelines
within three years after receiving a permit call. 80 An existing source also may
exceed the guidelines for a pollutant if the source can demonstrate that compli-
ance is technologically infeasible81 or would result in significant economic hard-
ship.82 These exceptions are premised on the belief that it is easier to adapt new
sources to technological innovations in pollution control than to retrofit existing
sources for the same pollution control. Generally, standards are more lax for
existing sources than for new sources. Existing sources falling into a technologi-
cal or economic infeasibility exception have three years after receiving written
76. Each category of toxic pollutants has a different averaging time. For carcinogens, facilities
must average data over a period of a year. See id. r. 2D.1 104(a). For chronic toxicants, acute
systemic toxicants, and acute irritants, facilities must average data for 24 hours, one hour, and 15
minutes respectively. Id. To show that no adverse affects on human health will result from emis-
sions exceeding the AALs, a source must demonstrate that the area in question is uninhabited and
that most persons probably will not occupy the area for the duration of the averaging time. Id. r.
2H.0610(b)(2).
77. Id. r. 2H.0610(b)(2)(B).
78. The Air Toxics Panel collected the best scientific data and used state-of-the-art techniques
for determining AALs. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-14, 19. Further, for carcinogens, the
Panel relied on judgments of the EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group because it felt that "these
risk assessments, which are made at a national level and are subject to extensive peer review, provide
the State with the best current scientific judgment about carcinogenic risks." 2 id. at V-472 (com-
ments at public hearing by Dr. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Chairman, Air Toxics Panel, North Carolina
Academy of Sciences). To obtain new toxicological data that would meet a facility's burden of
proof, the owner would have to hire a team of experts, which would prove quite costly and offer no
guarantee of success.
79. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(c).
80. Id. r. 2H.0610(c)(1).
81. Id. r. 2H.0610(c)(2). "Technologically infeasible" means that the technology necessary to
reduce emissions to a level that does not exceed the AALs does not exist. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7,
at 1-51 to 1-52 (agency response to comments).
82. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0160(c)(3). "'Significant economic hardship' means the
cost of installing the technology necessary to prevent the acceptable ambient levels from being ex-
ceeded would result in a negative net profit when the installation of the technology is amortized over
five years." I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-52 (agency response to comments).
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notification from the DEM to achieve maximum feasible control 8 3-not neces-
sadly AAL compliance. It may be quite some time, however, before the DEM
decides to notify certain industries. 84
How do owners or operators determine the ambient concentrations around
their facility? Owners are likely to use what is known as dispersion modeling. 85
Dispersion modeling estimates the concentration of a pollutant using mathemat-
ical simulations based on information about atmospheric and stack emission
conditions.86 The purpose of the models is to" 'predict pollutant concentrations
at any point in the neighborhood of the source.' "87 These models operate under
the assumption that a pollutant disperses vertically out of the smokestack and
then "disperses laterally as predicted by the laws of fluid dynamics."88 Disper-
sion modeling analysis typically consists of two stages: the screening stage and
the refining stage.8 9 The screening stage employs relatively simple techniques to
estimate a maximum pollutant concentration by using an array of "worst case"
meteorological data. Using "worst case" meteorology accounts for all possible
atmospheric conditions. This screening model is intentionally designed to over-
predict concentration levelsY0
If the screening model exhibits concentrations in excess of any applicable
state or federal standard for any pollutant, the owner performs refined disper-
sion modeling. The refined modeling is more exacting, time consuming, and
expensive and involves using actual meteorological data. The results of the re-
fined modeling are more precise and invariably predict lower concentrations
than the screening model. 9 1
The modeling process incorporates various facility-specific and meteorolog-
ical conditions by plugging these factors into a mathematical equation as vari-
ables or input. Some of these variables include wind speed, wind direction,
atmospheric stability, temperature, mixing height, emission rate, stack gas tem-
perature, stack gas exit velocity, stack diameter, stack height, and terrain fea-
tures.92 The EPA explains how a slight variation in a few of these parameters
can make a significant difference in ambient concentrations of a pollutant:
"[A] gaseous pollutant emitted over a grassy field will disperse much
83. N.C. ADmIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(d). "Maximum feasible control" means "the max-
imum degree of reduction for each pollutant... using the best technology that is available taking
into account, on a case-by-case basis, energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
costs." Id. r. 2H.0602(6).
84. Cf. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-45 to 1-46 (facilities will receive permit calls only as
quickly and to the extent that the permitting staff can manage the workload).
85. See id. at 1-35 (agency response to comments).
86. Case, Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models and Other
Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFI. L. REV. 251,
324 n.362 (1982).
87. Id. at 317 n.327 (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 348 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
88. Id. at 324 n.362.
89. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-35 (agency response to comments).
90. Id. at 1-35 to 1-36.
91. Id. at 1-36.
92. Id. at 1-37.
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differently than if the pollutant is emitted over a large urban area.
There the dispersion will be affected not only by the local weather con-
ditions but also by the greater turbulence caused by the different types
of surface areas and heat sources throughout a city."' 93
The problem with using so many highly sensitive variables is that modeling is
arguably an inaccurate method of determining ambient concentrations. Some
critics, for example, consider modeling "a very poor approximation of reality."' 94
On the other hand, one must keep in mind that facility owners use modeling for
permit purposes only; modeling determines only operational processes, air pollu-
tion control equipment parameters, and emissions rates to be included in the
permit. 95 Once a permit is issued, its conditions are enforced through monitor-
ing, not modeling.
The EMC chose modeling for this limited purpose because of its concern
with cost-effective methods to achieve its clean air goals. The permit program
itself can prove quite costly to industry, but the use of modeling to determine
ambient concentrations of a pollutant is much cheaper than establishing, main-
taining, and operating an adequate ambient monitoring network.96 Although
modeling is a plus for larger industries, which would be faced with installing
extensive monitoring equipment and hiring qualified personnel to staff their
many monitoring stations, smaller industries may find dispersion modeling to be
the more cumbersome choice.97 Dispersion modeling is highly technical and
requires computer time and expertise that may not be readily available in
smaller industries. The advantage of modeling, however, is that it allows all
calculations to occur on the premises in front of a computer, and industries are
more likely to get results quickly, even if it means sacrificing some accuracy.98
Facilities need permits before operating, and the convenience of modeling en-
sures fast and efficient permit issuance.
Once permits are in place, facilities must use monitoring and reporting de-
vices to determine compliance with the AALs.99 The regulations require facili-
ties with air quality permits to report emissions of listed TAPs.' °° Methods of
quantifying emissions include stack testing, mass balance calculations, and emis-
sions factors.10 1 The owner or operator of the facility is responsible for both the
determination of emission rates and the accuracy of the data.102
93. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting
EPA brief).
94. 3 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-2486 (comment at public hearings by William M. Deal,
Vice President of Manufacturing, Bernhardt Furniture Co.).
95. 1 id. at 1-36 (agency response to comments).
96. Id. at 1-35.
97. 2 id. at V-716 (comments by Larry Runyan on behalf of the American Furniture Manufac-
turers Association) (refined modeling requires "additional time and expertise which most industries
will not have available in-house").
98. Id. at 1-36 to 1-37.
99. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1105.
100. Id. r. 2D.1105(c)(1).
101. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-40.
102. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit 15A, r. 2D.1105; 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-40.
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II. NORTH CAROLINA'S HEALTH-BASED APPROACH TO AIR Toxics
CONTROL
North Carolina adopted acceptable ambient levels for each toxic air pollu-
tant without considering technological or economic infeasibility factors in its
assessment. This health-based approach10 3 presupposes that there is a certain
level of pollution to which the public may be exposed without sacrificing public
health and safety. This approach then establishes an acceptable or ideal limit on
the level of pollutants in the ambient air. The ambient air level is derived by
assessing various health-related factors and deciding on a level of risk that is
acceptable for the maintenance of public health and welfare." ° 4 Subsequently,
control measures are developed to achieve this ambient level. The health-based
approach in its purest form disregards technological or economic feasibility fac-
tors in its analysis.10 5 North Carolina, however, makes exception for existing
sources when compliance with AAL guidelines would constitute economic hard-
ship or when compliance is technologically infeasible.10 6 North Carolina, by
providing this exception, combines its health-based approach with another ap-
proach to pollution control, the technology-based approach.
The technology-based approach focuses on technology or pollution control
measures that are available and feasible in light of the type of industry involved
and often includes an inquiry into whether the industry is an existing or new
source. 107 Then, the best available technology (BAT) 10 8 or a similar standard is
applied regardless of whether any ambient goals are reached.10 9 Title III of the
1990 CAA amendments exemplifies the technology-based approach to pollution
control.
III. TrrLE III OF THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
In response to the failure of the health-based approach to air toxics regula-
tion in section 112,110 Congress enacted new legislation designed to remedy
some of the problems plaguing the previous CAA amendments.Il First, Con-
103. For a discussion of a technology-based approach to regulation, see infra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
104. The goal in setting ambient standards is to ensure that the air we breathe is sufficiently safe,
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
105. The health-based approach provides no room for consideration of technological and eco-
nomic feasibility. It often imposes standards that force industry to develop the control technologies
needed to protect public health fully. Cf. Note, supra note 15, at 619 (provisions of CAA § 112 are
technology-forcing); Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 16, at 539 (same).
106. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(c) (Aug. 1990); see supra notes 81-82 and accom-
panying text.
107. Cf Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1334-37
(1985) (criticizing the best available technology approach for distinguishing between existing and
new sources).
108. The BAT approach contemplates applying the best control technology currently available
to all similar types of industries uniformly. Id. at 1334-37. For the purposes of this Note, the BAT
approach shall be used when referring to a technology-based approach.
109. Graham, supra note 21, at 133.
110. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
111. See Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531-74 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)).
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gress took the initiative and established its own list of hazardous air pollutants
instead of delegating "listing" decisions to the EPA.' 12 In the past, the Agency
refused to identify substances producing adverse health effects because it knew
that after listing a pollutant it would not be able to write standards to regulate
it. 113
Instead of creating control standards for individual pollutants, the Admin-
istrator now establishes categories of industrial sources that emit substantial
amounts of each TAP.' 14 The EPA must publish the list of categories by No-
vember 15, 1991, and thereafter must provide an opportunity for public com-
ment on the list. 115 Once the EPA publishes the final list, the Act requires
regulation of all major sources in each category. 1 6 This source-by-source ap-
proach (as opposed to a pollutant-by-pollutant approach), combined with the
mandatory list of pollutants, should speed the regulation process and help pre-
vent foot-dragging by the EPA.
The Administrator must promulgate regulations establishing emission stan-
dards for all categories of major sources and area sources of TAPs. 1 7 The emis-
sion standards
shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the haz-
ardous air pollutants... that the Administrator, taking into considera-
tion the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air
quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements,
determines is achievable for new or existing sources in the category or
subcategory to which such emission standard applies. 118
Industries may implement this so-called maximum achievable control technol-
ogy (MACT) using a wide variety of control measures including installation of
control mechanisms, substitution of materials, change in work-practice method-
ology, and increased operational standards."19 The MACT control standard
represents a marked departure from the strict risk-based or health-based ap-
proach of the old air toxic regulations' 20 and allows the EPA to consider eco-
nomic as well as other non-health-based criteria in determining MACT.
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991). Under the 1990 CAA amendments, the EPA
Administrator has discretion to add to the list any pollutants that pose adverse health effects, but the
Administrator may delete pollutants from the list only upon a showing that the substance "may not
reasonably be anticipated to cause any adverse effects to the human health or adverse environmental
effects." Id. § 7412(b)(3)(B). Although it may be in the best interest of some industries to try to
petition for a change, scientific uncertainty will likely obviate any chance of success.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
114. J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 34.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c)(1).
116. Id. § 7412(d)(1). Further, the EPA must assure that "90 per cent of the area source emis-
sions of the 30 hazardous air pollutants that present the greatest threat to public health in the largest
number of urban areas" achieve compliance within ten years. Id. § 7412(c)(3).
117. Id. § 7412(d)(1).
118. Id. § 7412(d)(2).
119. Id. § 7412(d)(2)(A)-(E). This provision offers greater flexibility in control measures than
was permitted under § 112 of the 1977 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1988), amended by 42
U.S.C.A. § 7412(d) (West Supp. 1991).
120. See J. QUARLES & W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 33; supra notes 24-29 and accompanying
text. In the past, the EPA sought to graft such considerations onto the old regulations despite the
fact that the literal language of§ 112 did not allow inclusion of technological or economic feasibility
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As is common to technology-based statutes, 12 1 the 1990 amendments im-
pose more stringent standards on new sources than on existing sources. For new
sources, the MACT may be no less stringent than the emission control currently
achieved in practice by what the Administrator determines is the best controlled
similar source. 122 Existing sources may have less stringent standards than new
sources in the same category; the standard, however, may not be less stringent
than the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing twelve per-
cent of existing sources in the category of thirty or more sources, or the average
emission limitation achieved by the best performing five sources in the category
with fewer than thirty sources. 123 Although new source standards are tougher
than those for existing sources, technological and economic feasibility continue
to be appropriate factors to consider in determining new source MACT.124
The new amendments also provide a schedule for the promulgation of
MACT standards. By November 15, 1992, EPA must establish priorities for its
list of source categories by considering the adverse effects of TAPs on the public
health and the environment, the quantity and location of TAP emissions that
each category will emit, and the efficiency of grouping categories according to
the pollutants emitted. 125 Once the EPA sets priorities, it must promulgate
MACT standards for the first forty categories no later than two years after en-
actment of the 1990 CAA. 126 Within four years, the EPA must establish stan-
dards for twenty-five percent of all of the listed categories. Within seven years
standards must be promulgated for an additional twenty-five percent of the
source categories, and at the end of ten years, all listed categories must have
standards in place. 127
All sources must comply with MACT standards within three years after
promulgation. 128 Congress, however, has built in an incentive for sources to
reduce emissions on their own. The amendments provide that an existing source
may obtain a six-year extension for compliance if it achieves a ninety percent
reduction in emissions prior to the proposal of an applicable MACT stan-
dard.1 29 Existing sources may want to analyze technological mechanisms, eco-
nomic factors, and regulatory schemes to decide whether they can make a few
minor changes now in order to qualify for the six-year extension later.130 Be-
cause these decisions must be made before MACT standards are issued, how-
ever, industry must predict now whether achieving an immediate ninety-percent
reduction will result in a savings over the cost of future compliance. Most likely,
factors in the equation. See supra note 29. Now Congress has chosen to incorporate those factors in
the 1990 amendments. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
121. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1335-36.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(3).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 7412(d)(2), (3); see J. QUARLES & W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 34.
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 7412(i)(3)(A).
129. Id. § 7412(i)(5).
130. J. QUARLES & W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 35.
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industries will have to conduct a cost-benefit analysis individually to decide
whether the cost of voluntary reductions now is less than any benefits associated
with a six-year delay of the MACT standards.
Because of the EPA's prior record of laxity in promulgating air toxics con-
trol regulations, 13 1 Congress was not content to leave the implementation of
MACT standards to the Agency completely, so it designed the so-called
"MACT hammer."' 32 If the EPA fails to promulgate MACT standards as re-
quired, sources will become subject to case-by-case MACT standards after states
have their permit programs approved.133 Permits will contain emission limita-
tions for TAPs subject to regulation so that there will be equivalent standards
under this alternative regulatory method.
Once the EPA establishes MACT standards, it must decide whether more
stringent standards are required after application of MACT controls to protect
the public health with an "ample margin of safety... [and] taking into consider-
ation costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, [to prevent] an adverse
environmental effect."'134 This plan, designed to address the problem of residual
risks, is one health-based aspect that Congress has not abandoned. The EPA
must promulgate residual risk standards with an ample margin of safety nine
years after establishing MACT standards in the case of the first source categories
regulated and eight years for all other categories. 135 Legislation mandates that
the EPA establish residual risk standards for carcinogens that present a cancer
risk greater than one in one million after MACT controls have been installed. 136
Because of the uncertainty of risk assessment, the 1990 amendments call for the
National Academy of Sciences to review the EPA's risk assessment methodol-
ogy for determining carcinogenic risk associated with air toxics exposure and to
recommend improvements in methodology.1
37
The above regulations primarily deal with normal, everyday releases from
facilities. In addition, the new amendments propose methods of preventing and
responding to accidental releases of toxic substances.' 38 Here, the amendments
require a completely new regulatory program. The EPA must publish, not later
than November 15, 1992, an "initial list of 100 substances which, in the case of
131. See supra 26-29 and accompanying text.
132. J. QUARLES & W. Lawis, supra note 12, at 34.
133. Id.; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 74120). The state-issued permits "shall contain emission limitations
for the hazardous air pollutants... emitted by the source that the Administrator (or the State)
determines, on a case-by-case basis, to be equivalent to the limitation that would apply to such
source if an emission standard had been promulgated in a timely manner." Id. § 74120)(5). This
provision adds a layer of protection in case the EPA fails to promulgate an emissions standard. It
also requires the states to apply the MACT standards required under federal law.
134. 42 U.S.C.A § 7412(f)(2). The EPA must promulgate these more rigorous standards in the
event Congress fails to act on its risk assessment report. Id. § 7412(f)(l)-(2).
135. Id. § 7412(f)(2)(C).
136. Id. The federal act requires that categories of sources emitting a pollutant classified as a
known, probable, or possible human carcinogen reduce emissions to a level associated with a lifetime
cancer risk of less than one in one million. The North Carolina regulations, however, distinguish
between known and probable carcinogens by allowing an acceptable risk of one in 100,000 for prob-
able human carcinogens. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
138. J. QuARLEs & NV. LEwis, supra note 12, at 36; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r).
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accidental release, are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause
death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment." 139
The amendments identify sixteen pollutants that must be included. 140 By 1993
the EPA must promulgate regulations for the prevention and detection of acci-
dental releases and measures for emergency response, including the preparation
of risk management plans.141 Owners or operators of a facility subject to acci-
dental-release regulations subsequently will be required to develop risk manage-
ment plans that comply with the EPA regulations and include a hazard
assessment, a prevention program, and a response plan.1 42
In sum, the new federal regulation of air toxics has shifted from a health- or
risk-based approach to primarily a technology-based approach, applying MACT
standards to similarly situated sources and allowing for more flexible methods of
control technology.
IV. RETENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA'S AIR Toiacs REGULATIONS
The North Carolina and federal regulations take two different approaches
to the problem of cleaning the ambient air. North Carolina relied on a predomi-
nantly health-based approach in formulating AALs, 143 whereas the 1990 CAA
amendments use a technology-based approach in prescribing emissions stan-
dards. 144 Although both the North Carolina and the federal programs combine
elements of each approach, both are essentially predicated on one theory or the
other. Neither approach to environmental regulation has obtained overwhelm-
ing support. 145 Environmentalists advocate preservation of public health and a
clean environment at any cost and therefore favor a strict health-based ap-
proach. Industrialists, in contrast, view cost minimization as a primary goal and
favor a technology-based approach. As a result, two opposing groups actively
dispute the value of these two methods of regulation.' 46 The choices are not as
clear cut as they may seem, however, for each method contains inherent
weaknesses.
Neither the health-based nor the technology-based approach can be effec-
tive on its own because each addresses different issues. The technology-based
approach responds to immediate problems of scarcity and technological in-
feasibility but fails to project a long-term plan for pollution reduction.147 The
health-based approach, in contrast, takes an idealistic approach to long-term
139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(3).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B).
142. Id.; see J. QUARLES & W. LEwIS, supra note 12, at 36.
143. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at I-11 (agency response to comments).
144. See J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 33.
145. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-66 to 1-69 (agency summary of testimony in favor of
technology-based regulatory scheme); cf. Doniger, supra note 55, at 555-56 (comparing health-based
and technology-based statutes regulating toxics at state and federal levels).
146. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-4 to I-11 (agency summary of the competing arguments
of industry and environmentalists); Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency. Implementation
of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1293 (1985).
147. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1335-37.
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goals, but ignores the short-term problem of limited technical innovation and
resources. 148 In addition to these theoretical difficulties, practical problems
plague both approaches. The efficacy of the health-based approach is limited by
scientific uncertainties associated with risk assessment, 149 while the technology-
based approach avoids the risk assessment difficulties, but faces problems of sub-
stantial cost and limited flexibility needed to address the idiosyncracies of indi-
vidual facilities.' 50
Despite the substantial difficulties encountered in each regulatory approach,
North Carolina should retain its health-based regulations in conjunction with
the federal scheme for several reasons. First, although risk assessment tech-
niques are fraught with uncertainties, the Air Toxics Panel used the best possible
research techniques and based its assumptions on the most current data avail-
able.151 The major problem facing the Panel and agencies applying the health-
based approach to TAP regulation is the treatment of carcinogens and the corre-
sponding risks. Risk assessment, the most common technique used in epidemio-
logical studies, requires scientific determinations under conditions of substantial
uncertainty concerning the risks involved, limited availability of scientific data,
and economic barriers to conducting adequate research.152
Ultimately, the health-based or risk-based approach is subject to the con-
fines of present scientific knowledge. Many statutes using the health-based ap-
proach result in two-part risk assessment analysis. The first part involves a
political decision as to what level of cancer risk is acceptable. The second part is
a scientific determination of the level of exposure to a pollutant which causes
that particular risk.153 Unfortunately, the causal relationship between a pollu-
tant and cancer is often difficult to assess.' 54 Part of the problem is that cancer
is a latent disease that fails to manifest itself until fifteen to forty years after
exposure begins.155 Also, the operation of chemical carcinogens and their effect
on human metabolic processes confound scientists. 156 There is substantial disa-
greement in the scientific community as to how much exposure to a potential
carcinogen actually begins cell mutation. Scientists question whether one brief
exposure is enough or whether several extended exposures within a short period
148. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 to 1-69 (agency summary of comments).
149. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 508-14.
150. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 (agency response to comments); Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 107, at 1335-36.
151. See supra note 78.
152. Doniger, supra note 55, at 508-14. These factors prevent agencies from making precise and
informed decisions about risks at varying degrees of pollutant exposure. The limitations of science
and the controversial nature of risk management techniques result in substantial litigation challeng-
ing these acceptable risk levels as unfounded and capricious, leaving the agencies constantly fighting
for ground. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
630-38 (1980).
153. See Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
89, 89 (1988).
154. Doniger, supra note 55, at 510. To account for gaps in scientific knowledge, regulators
incorporate conservative estimates into risk assessment models. See Latin, supra note 153, at 94
(noting the inconsistent treatment of uncertainty in risk assessment).
155. Doniger, supra note 55, at 511-12.
156. Id. at 510.
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of time will cause cancer to appear. 157 The most perplexing yet important ques-
tion is what risks can be expected from a varying range of doses.158 If this
correlation was known, risk levels for carcinogens probably could withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny. Because of the lack of human studies, scientists have had to
resort to animal studies to predict human exposure risks. 159 Two problems arise
when using animal studies. First, there is uncertainty in extrapolating dose-re-
sponse levels across species lines. 160 Second, because scientists must use rela-
tively small test groups, 161 chemicals must be administered at high dosages to
establish a strong correlation between the dose and an adverse effect.162 There-
fore, scientists must extrapolate to low doses to mimic the actual exposure level
in the environment. 163
In short, agencies cannot predict how a difference in risk correlates to small
changes in dose strength. The North Carolina Air Toxics Panel had to recom-
mend guidelines with these scientific uncertainties in mind. Thus, the Panel
combined policy decisions with scientific determinations to propose air toxics
regulations. The Panel emphasized that, given scientific uncertainties, its ap-
proach "should not be considered a precise method distinguishing safe from un-
safe levels of contaminants, but rather a means to establish flexible guidelines
which can be used to raise flags of concern and set priorities for action." 164
AALs may be riddled with educated guesses that tend to err on the side of
conservatism in order to protect the public health. Nonetheless, the Panel based
the AALs on value judgments reflecting the best available scientific information
at the time165 and cannot be accused of being arbitrary or capricious.
The second reason North Carolina should apply its regulations in addition
to those established under federal law is that the State has refined its regulatory
system by dividing the hazardous air pollutants into noncarcinogens and carcin-
ogens and using assessment methods that cater to known properties of each. 166
This category-specific approach affords the greatest degree of protection because
guidelines may be more or less stringent based on varying degrees of toxicity.
For the categories of noncarcinogens, the Air Toxics Panel used TLVs for chem-
157. Id. at 510-11. Scientists also differ over whether the human body has defense mechanisms
against a single exposure and the possible effects of combined carcinogenic substances. Id.
158. Id. at 511.
159. Id. at 512.
160. Id. at 513.
161. In order to conduct an animal study with a 95% accuracy rate, the test must involve at
least six million animals. These experiments are not practical because of tremendous expense and
vulnerability to statistical errors. Id.
162. Id. at 512-13. Scientists cannot trace sufficiently low doses of chemicals in small test
groups. Thus, to induce cancer at detectable rates, scientists must administer chemicals to test ani-
mals at much higher doses than humans normally would experience. Id. at 512.
163. Id. at 513.
164. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 5.
165. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-14 (agency response to comments questioning the scientific
data used to determine AALs).
166. See supra notes 51-63. Varying treatment for carcinogens and noncarcinogens not only
adds an element of flexibility to North Carolina's approach, but also adds credibility to health-based
standards.
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icals and multiplied them by various safety factors to come up with AALs.'6 7
The TLVs are limits assigned to industrial chemicals--chemicals found in the
work place by agencies such as the American Conference of Government and
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) and the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA).168 The ACGIH has assessed threshold levels of chemi-
cals in the work place for over forty years, and these threshold limits for
noncarcinogenic pollutants are fairly well established. 169 The ACGIH con-
ducted extensive research on limited groups of workers exposed to a limited
number of pollutants at specific times and for an exact duration. The TLV de-
terminations represent the best judgment of safe occupational levels given the
present state of knowledge.170 The Air Toxics Panel took these values and com-
pensated for the differing environment, exposure times, and varying susceptibili-
ties to reflect outdoor conditions. 17 1 These adjustment factors, however, are not
well established and involve discretionary judgments in converting TLVs to le-
gitimate AALs. Industry argued that this modified TLV factored approach was
not appropriate for outdoor exposure, and the addition of strict numerical fac-
tors could not simulate the variance between the work place and continuous
outdoor exposure.' 72 Although this may be true, the final ambient levels were a
product of established scientific data and the best educated assumptions based
on this reliable data. Furthermore, if clean air goals are to be attained, regula-
tors must bite the bullet and undauntedly push for health-based regulatory
schemes in the face of scientific uncertainty.
This same argument applies to the regulation of carcinogens, which inher-
ently involves more uncertainty, requiring even more guesswork. Applying the
most advanced scientific methods, the Air Toxics Panel accepted the risk of one
cancer per million persons exposed, and it performed quantitative risk analysis
to determine the incremental concentration of a pollutant associated with that
risk. 173 Because it is not feasible to conduct experiments on animals or make
human observations to define this low risk level, the Panel had to choose a statis-
tical model to estimate the dose associated with this acceptable low risk. The
modeling process is scientific in that it incorporates principles of extrapolation
and estimation. There is no proof that one particular model is clearly right or
valid, however, and these models usually lead to widely divergent results. The
Panel decided to use the fairly conservative linearized multistage model to extra-
polate from high dose animal studies.' 74 The Panel chose this method because it
167. See supra note 54.
168. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-14 (agency response to comments).
169. Id.
170. See 4 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-35; ACGIH, supra note 36, at 3.
171. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-15; AIR Toxlcs PANEi, supra note 42, at 9-16.
172. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-13 to 1-14 (agency summary of comments by industry
representatives).
173. In comments responding to a proposal by the EPA for regulation of benzene in 1988, the
National Resources Defense Council accepted this same risk. The Council relied on various sources
that cite a risk of one in one million as the upper bound for de minimis risk. Marchant & Danzeisen,
supra note 16, at 543-44.
174. Letter from Dr. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Chairman, Air Toxics Panel, North Carolina Academy
of Sciences to Gladys Van Pelt, Ph.D, Chair, Air Quality Committee, Environmental Management
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incorporated an adequate set of conservative assumptions regarding human can-
cer risks at low doses.175 To ensure that the most accurate, up-to-date scientific
information will be used for future regulation, the North Carolina Department
of Environment, Health and Natural Resources is establishing a Secretary's Sci-
entific Advisory Board to advise the EMC and DEM on current developments
in toxicology and health risks of air toxicS. 17 6 This step adds a layer of protec-
tion so that guesswork in establishing acceptable ambient levels is kept to a
minumum.
North Carolina should retain the air toxics regulations because of the flexi-
bility written into its provisions. While maintaining its health-based goals, the
state program makes allowances to exceed AALs and in limited circumstances
permits variances for existing sources. A variance may be granted if a facility
demonstrates that compliance is impracticable due to technological in-
feasibility.1 77 This provision allowing for variances recognizes the difficulty in
retrofitting old sources with control devices. If an existing source is successful in
demonstrating that meeting the ambient standards is technologically infeasible,
then it need only install "maximum feasible control technology." 178 Allowing
for variances represents a melding of the technology-based and health-based ap-
proaches and is one of the most apparent concessions North Carolina made to
industry.
The state regulations also offer flexibility by regulating on a facility-by-facil-
ity basis rather than in the uniform manner applied under the 1990 CAA
amendments. This distinction can be illustrated by comparing aspects of the
North Carolina air toxics program with parallel provisions of the federal
scheme.
First, the North Carolina regulations mandate that each owner or operator
of a facility apply for a permit in order to emit a toxic pollutant. 179 The North
Carolina regulations also require each owner to conduct computer dispersion
Commission (July 29, 1988) (discussing Air Toxic Panel's recommendations), reprinted in 4 HEAR-
INGS, supra note 7, at VI-175.
175. Id. This model assumes that risk is linearly proportional to concentration.
176. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-91; see Division of Environmental Management, Depart-
ment of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources, Draft: Secretary's Advisory Board on Toxic
Air Pollutants (undated) (describing Advisory Board's composition and function), reprinted in 4
HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-193.
177. A variance gives a facility an opportunity to avoid the stringent standards and possibly opt
for lesser standards by meeting certain conditions. North Carolina allows variances for existing
sources if they can demonstrate technological infeasibility, see supra note 81, or economic hardship,
see supra note 82, in complying with the ambient guidelines. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
2D.0610(c)(2)-(3) (Aug. 1990). An existing source may delay compliance by submitting an accepta-
ble schedule that provides for compliance within three years. Id. r. 2D.0610(c)(1). The Code does
not specify how quickly reductions must proceed during the three-year interval nor whether reduc-
tions must be constant and gradual. In any case, a facility may be able to emit pollutants that exceed
ambient levels for a period of three years if the DEM accepts its schedule. Id. The variance for a
new source is much more difficult to obtain because it requires that the source prove either that its
emissions do not exceed acceptable ambient levels beyond its property boundary, or that such emis-
sions will not adversely affect human health. Id.
178. See supra note 83.
179. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(a).
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modeling to determine its ambient contribution for a pollutant.18 0 Based on
these models, the State will implement control technology on an individualized
basis to assure that the facility will not contribute significant amounts of a pollu-
tant into the ambient air.
In contrast, the 1990 CAA amendments require that once the EPA lists a
category of sources, all sources within the category must achieve emission reduc-
tions by applying the MACT standard.18 1 This approach is a highly centralized,
industry-uniform system often used to implement BAT: the standards apply to
all industries of similar types regardless of their geographic location, climate, or
population size of those affected. Uniform standards neglect certain areas and
allow for creation of high concentrations of pollutants in small areas, or so-
called "hot spots.' 18 2
State systems like North Carolina's can alleviate particularly problematic
areas by requiring each source to have a pollution reduction permit and de-
manding that each facility reduce its own emissions so that collective emissions
do not exceed AALs. Whereas uniform controls may prove dysfunctional by
regulating some areas more or less than necessary, highly decentralized controls
can be tailored to redress specific pollution problems. For example, each of sev-
eral sources located in close proximity may comply with uniform federal stan-
dards on an individual basis, yet the combination of their emissions may cause a
significant ambient concentration within the vicinity. A decentralized system
like North Carolina's specifically addresses each facility's emissions based on
ambient concentrations in the neighboring area and thereby can assure that the
ambient concentration in a particular industrial area is not exceeded. Further-
more, North Carolina's regulations require facilities to apply additional control
technology if emissions of two or more sources located in a small area exceed
AALs.1s 3
A highly centralized, uniform approach does have some advantages over a
more individualized approach. They include:
decreased information collection and evaluation costs, greater consis-
tency and predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions to
public scrutiny and participation, increased likelihood that regulations
will withstand judicial review, reduced opportunities for manipulative
behavior by agencies in response to political or bureaucratic pressures,
reduced opportunities for obstructive behavior by regulated parties,
and decreased likelihood of social dislocation and "forum shopping"
resulting from competitive disadvantages between geographical regions
180. Id. r. 2H.0610(o)(I).
181. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c) (West Supp. 1991); J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at
34.
182. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1350.
183. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1107(a) (Aug. 1990). "The owner of a facility shall not
be required to conduct [a] multi-facility ambient impact analysis .... This type of analysis shall be
done by the Division of Environmental Management." Id. r. 2D.1 107(c). The Division may require
a facility to install additional control technology if ambient impact analysis reveals that it is neces-
sary to protect the public from the combined effect of multifacility pollutants. Id. r. 2D.1 107(a).
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or between firms in regulated industries.184
At the federal level, this uniform approach has fostered significant improve-
ments in environmental quality with a cost to society that has not proved exces-
sive. 185 Nevertheless, opponents still argue that uniform standards are not cost-
effective.186 Uniform requirements may waste billions of dollars annually by
ignoring variations among plants and industries in the cost of reducing pollution
and by ignoring geographic variations in pollution effects. 187 Some argue that
North Carolina's health-based approach allows for the most cost-effective meth-
ods by regulating facility by facility.188 Only facilities that need emissions re-
duction will put on control technology, and sources that need emissions
reductions will use only those methods that assure that ambient guidelines will
not be exceeded.
This argument also supports North Carolina's use of a health-based regula-
tory system rather than a technology-based system, such as BAT. The technol-
ogy-based approach used by the federal government would prove much more
costly for North Carolina than implementing a health-based approach, because
under the control technology approach, every industry emitting toxic air pollu-
tants would have to install the best control equipment whether or not such con-
trols were necessary to meet the AALs.189 Because the implicit goal of BAT is
the air quality level attainable if every facility installed BAT,190 the technology-
based approach does not assure or even attempt to assure that public health is
protected from any adverse health effects. 191 What happens if the best available
technology is in place and an unacceptable risk to human health is still present?
Additional controls are not technologically or economically feasible in the BAT
scenario. 192 The health-based approach allows for many options to achieve am-
bient goals, including reduced emissions or substitution of materials, because it
is not constrained by best available technology.
Furthermore, BAT approaches, although assuring that sources install es-
tablished control technologies, do not provide a strong incentive for the develop-
ment of new technology. 193 Once BAT is in place, industry has complied with
the standard and no more need be done. Such an approach may even discourage
the development of new technology, and the long-term effect may be devastat-
ing. Similarly, others contend that the "BAT strategy is inconsistent with intel-
ligent priority setting." 194 Merely applying maximum pollution controls to the
pollutant that makes the regulatory agenda may prevent an agency from ad-
184. Latin, supra note 146, at 1271.
185. Id. at 1273. This is not to say that even excessive costs could not be absorbed by society if
necessary.
186. Id. at 1273 n.25.
187. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1335.
188. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 (agency response to comments).
189. Id. at 1-68 to 1-69.
190. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1341.
191. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 (agency response to comments).
192. Id.
193. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1336.
194. Id. at 1337.
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dressing the most serious pollutants first. Once a new pollutant is identified,
BAT requires costly inquiries into the state of control technology in the indus-
tries emitting such pollutants. Then BAT requires implementation of control to
the full extent of available technology for each particular pollutant.195 Not only
is this an inefficient method of prioritizing, it is inefficient in terms of cost.
North Carolina should retain the regulations not only because they better
meet North Carolina's needs, but also because they may meet its needs sooner.
The 1990 CAA amendments contain a complex regulatory timetable. The
amendments do not require facilities to put on control technology until after the
EPA establishes categories of sources and decides how to rank the categories. 196
The EPA then must promulgate emissions standards for each source category.
The schedule requires the EPA to decide on emissions standards for only forty
source categories by November 1992.197 Once the EPA establishes emissions
standards, new CAA provisions require facilities to apply MACT within three
years. 198 This means that it may be November 1995 before the first industries
(listed in the forty source categories) will have to comply with the federal regula-
tions, and it will be November 2000 before fifty percent of the source categories
will be regulated. 199
The North Carolina scheme has the potential to ensure regulation sooner
than Title III. Regulations for eighty-four pollutants became effective in May
1990.200 Already, new sources must apply for permits before beginning con-
struction so that AALs will not be exceeded.20 1 Existing sources must apply for
permits within 180 days after receiving a permit call.202 Once an existing source
applies for a permit, it must apply MACT no later than three years after receiv-
ing notification. Ideally, if the DEM calls existing sources now, they must com-
ply with the air toxics guidelines by May 1993 because, unlike the federal
statutory provisions, the DEM need only call a facility's SIC, and compliance
must follow within three years. 20 3 The DEM need not decide on source catego-
ries and emissions limitations before requiring any control technology.
North Carolina should not only retain its regulations but should strive for
implementation as soon as possible. Accordingly, the DEM should commence
permit calling as soon as feasible. The CAA should not provide an excuse to
hold back implementation of the state regulations and wait for the EPA to set
national emissions standards. Because North Carolina's regulations place no
195. Id. at 1359.
196. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e) (West Supp. 1991); J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at
37-38.
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e). These first categories may or may not include pollutants that are
prevalent in North Carolina.
198. Id. § 7412(i).
199. Id. § 7412(e) (standards for half of the categories must be promulgated by November 1997);
Id. § 7412(i) (industries have three years from promulgation to comply). This timetable assumes no
bureaucratic delay or foot dragging by the EPA and that the EPA has sufficient resources to accom-
plish the CAA regulatory program.
200. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990).
201. Id. r. 2H.0610(a)(1).
202. Id. r. 2H.0610(a)(3).
203. The DEM, however, may call a SIC code at any time. See supra note 84.
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time constraints on the DEM regarding permit calls, the DEM may wait an
indefinite period of time before notifying existing sources. Although such delay
may be permitted by the Code, the DEM would sacrifice public health by its
inaction. North Carolina toxic air pollutants continue to be a major problem
that the federal program may not address for five years. Furthermore, even
when the CAA requires compliance with the first standards within five years
after enactment of the statute, the government-regulated pollutants may not
pose a threat to North Carolina. In other words, state facilities may emit certain
pollutants that the EPA decides warrant a lower priority. In that case, facilities
need not apply control technology until 1997 or later. Finally, the 1990 CAA
amendments do not address North Carolina's "hot spots" sufficiently, whereas
the state regulations contemplate multiple-facility emissions.
V. CONCLUSION
North Carolina has abandoned the industry-uniform, technology-based ap-
proach in favor of a more flexible health-based approach, even though this ap-
proach had proved unworkable at the federal level. The state has not fully
implemented the plan yet and will not know its efficacy for some time. The
North Carolina regulations emphasize goals slightly different from those of the
CAA. First, risk management and public safety are of the utmost importance in
the state system and, as such, the regulators are willing to face the uncertainties
of risk assessment and opt for intelligent guesses based on the best scientific
information available, rather than sacrificing air quality and suppressing uncer-
tainties in a BAT system. The second state goal is improving long-term air qual-
ity by encouraging scientific innovation and variation in control technology at
the industry level. In implementing an individualized facility-by-facility ap-
proach, only those facilities in need of controls install them; this method of regu-
lation is not only cost-effective but also resource-conscious. Finally, the state
program advocates the use of a scientific panel to review listed TAPs and re-
search possible air toxics in trying to assure that the EMC will revise present
standards upon receipt of new scientific data and that facilities will install new
control technology as needed.
North Carolina should retain its regulations in conjunction with the federal
statutes because the state regulations offer a bold, individualized approach to
health-based environmental regulation with a view to cost-effectiveness and op-
portunity for limited variances for economic or technological infeasibility.
North Carolina's decentralized regulations can address specific problem areas
that the federal system of uniform standards may overlook. While the North
Carolina regulations set ambient air concentration guidelines, the CAA amend-
ments require emission reduction based on MACT standards. Theoretically,
neither regulatory system excludes the other and industries can comply with
both.2° 4 Keeping the state's health-based interests in mind, the DEM should
204. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-73 to 1-74 (agency response to comments). Furthermore,
the state probably will adopt the EPA's standards. There should be no conflict in having two sets of
standards or regulations-one for emission rates and one for ambient concentrations. See id.
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implement the state guidelines for all sources as quickly as possible. The option
to delay permit calls and subsequent regulatory control may seem attractive to
the DEM now; 20 5 a "wait-to-see" attitude, however, subverts the original intent
behind these health-based regulations. The EMC considered the possibility of
concurrent federal regulations and decided that "[t]o wait for Congress to act
would produce needless and unnecessary delay."' 20 6 If the state sits on its hands
and fails to implement its own program, it gives facility owners a license to
pollute. Where North Carolina has the opportunity and the mechanism to con-
trol its own environmental destiny it should do so, and not rely on a federal
program that contains no assurance of success.
DEANNA SCHMIT
205. Although industry predicts the permitting process will produce a bottleneck because of
limited resources of the permitting staff, the EMC remains convinced that the permit calling process
will spread the workload sufficiently to allow for adequate review of permits. Id. at 1-45 to 1-46.
206. Id. at 1-73.
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